Australia has already undertaken a range of measures to manage the information environment, detailed above.

These efforts are welcome steps and Australia has often been a first mover in this space – as, for example, with negotiating with online platforms to pay for news.

But these measures have not been enough to stem the tide of disinformation in both the national and global information environment.

The experts who contributed to this paper offer the following recommendations as a contribution to realising a positive vision of a healthy, safe, engaging and democratic information ecosystem.

A NATIONAL BODY FOR THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Australia should create a national body that identifies and pre-empts emerging problems in the information environment and marshals resources and expertise to find solutions. This body would draw together, and coordinate work being done in individual agencies across government and include mechanisms to engage in dialogue with, and draw on the expertise of, non-government actors such as industry, civil society, non-governmental organisations and academics working in the space. This requires a legislative basis.

Such a body would help government create a strong, enforceable regulatory framework that sets a standard of conduct, as well as legal parameters for foreign technology companies operating in Australia. It should function as a vehicle that promotes constant dialogue between government, industry and the Australian public.

Consultees had a range of views on the role of government in the information environment. Some argued that the government should keep its role as minimal as possible by setting the conditions for a healthy information ecosystem and keeping direct intervention to a minimum. This would include providing economic incentives and nudging but would be wary of being too restrictive. One participant pointed to the current disinformation legislation before Commonwealth Parliament and the danger of giving the government of the day too much power to define what is and is not disinformation and suggested that the approach should be incentivising platforms to create an information environment that better serves the public interest.

However, others argued that a low-key role for government may prove ineffective given the constantly evolving threats in the information domain.

Participants agreed that one of the most important things that all branches of government can do is set high standards of truth and to develop the facility for strategic pre-bunking and rapid response help prevent disinformation from becoming normalised in Australia’s political system.

It may also be useful to create teams in government departments with one dissemination point that are responsible for calling out coordinated disinformation that targets Australia as soon as it appears and demonstrating to the public and disinformation networks that the government is aware and responding. This could be especially valuable in a time of national or regional crisis. One model could be the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s Smartraveller program.

INCREASE RESOURCING FOR PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BODIES IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The ability of standard setting and accountability bodies such as the Australian Communications and Media Authority to undertake oversight and hold those who breach standards to account is currently limited by resource constraints. The government should increase resourcing for bodies that oversee professional standards in the information environment in line with the impact that this space has across all aspects of Australian society. This should include re-focusing scrutiny on ‘traditional’ media, as well as developing and updating guidelines for emerging technologies such as generative AI.

Investment in domestic standards bodies would also better equip Australia to contribute to and influence the development of global norms around standards.

STRENGTHEN REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT OF SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS

The government should also strengthen regulation over key elements of the business model of major social media and other information- and data-gathering platforms, such as third-party data-brokering, targeted advertising and recommendation algorithms.

In the case of anti-disinformation legislation, some consultees recommended that the government not set a threshold definition for disinformation, but instead provide for an inclusive, dynamic, democratic process of negotiating what is and isn’t acceptable in the information environment.

Part of this effort needs to be the co-design of a binding framework (at minimum a memorandum of understanding, and ideally a mandatory code of practice) around content moderation on social media platforms that involves the participation of civil society, government, media, researchers and industry. This could look like a more inclusive version of the Facebook Oversight Board and would also include negotiating better access to social media content for disinformation researchers.

Current regulation relating to child exploitation material, or the livestreaming of terrorist attacks offer a useful precedent of social media entities collaborating with government to prevent the propagation of harmful material. This could provide a model for combating information operations which, from an operational viewpoint, have signatures that are different from typical social media behaviour.

There also needs to be an urgent consideration of what regulation needs to look like as generative artificial intelligence (AI) begins to flood the internet. To this end, Australia needs to breach immediately find ways to work with companies like Open AI, to ensure that new AI products are transparent, safe, and will not cause the further breakdown of the information environment.

STRENGTHEN TRANSPARENCY, INVESTIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS

Given the complexity of the technology involved as well as the size and power of tech companies, the government should ensure that it has the power and the data – and sufficient resources – to properly investigate breaches of legislation such as the 2022 Optus and Medibank privacy breaches. It needs to be able to act quickly and decisively, which means a strategic and pre-emptive approach to monitoring disinformation networks online.

SUPPORT AUSTRALIAN DIASPORAS TARGETED BY DISINFORMATION AND HARASSMENT CAMPAIGNS

As an adjunct to a national, strategically focused body, Australian intelligence and security organisations should also work more closely with other government bodies to strengthen the capacity to provide tangible and rapid support to Australian citizens targeted by malicious foreign actors. As a first step, the government should undertake a multilingual campaign to raise awareness of the national security hotline among members of the public who may not be aware of it.

One consultee gave the example of Australian citizens targeted online by the Iranian regime. Interference in Australia’s Chinese, Russian, Ukrainian, Rwandan, Sudanese communities has been well-documented and is likely to keep increasing. This targeting can include repeated and persistent online threats of physical violence to individuals and their families, false accusations of criminal activity, persistent dehumanising language and the hacking of citizens’ computers.

In addition to increased information sharing and collaboration between security and intelligence organisations and other government agencies, a rapid response capability could be achieved by further expanding the remit of, and a concomitant increase in resourcing for, the eSafety Commissioner to support diaspora groups being targeted. As the most public-facing Australian body for safety from online crime and exploitation, embedding such a mandate within the eSafety Commissioner is an option that is less likely to trigger political sensitivities.

LITERACY AND INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

The government should develop a long-term public communications strategy that actively supports truth-based communication and that consistently makes the case for science, for facts and for accurate information. Consultees stressed that the content of these campaigns need to be extremely engaging, using the best Australian creative talent, to cut through and needs to be aimed at multiple Australian audiences across all media platforms.

A key feature of this would be a comprehensive digital media literacy campaign that clearly articulates:

• values of press freedom, media ethics, privacy and freedom of speech
• what constitutes hate speech, on-line bullying and trolling, disinformation and propaganda
• the critical thinking skills needed to be resilient in the face of cognitive manipulation and exploitation
• how to navigate the internet as synthetic, manipulated images and text created by generative AI become widespread

The program should be well-funded, long term and take place from primary education level onwards. The content should be fun and engaging, with face-to-face learning and collective problem solving emphasised. This would need to include support for educators and teachers to help them combat disinformation in the classroom.

Regular broad-based public information campaigns on recognising disinformation and propaganda using engaging creative content are equally important.

These campaigns need to be ramped up around elections to ensure a minimum of manipulation. However, there is a question mark over whether public literacy campaigns would work in the case of generative artificial intelligence (AI). As the technology improves, most research shows that when people are asked to distinguish between a digitally manipulated or fake image and a real one, they will almost always choose the fake image.

In addition to broad based public awareness campaigns, digital media literary needs to be included in education curriculums from early childhood onwards, to help children and young adults build resilience against the many harms targeted at them in the information environment.

In thinking about such a framework, radicalisation prevention and support strategies should be built into education programs that deal with the information environment. Young adults, especially young men, are prime targets for radicalisation. Consultees suggested that elements of a successful education campaign would include: learning how to recognise disinformation and propaganda aimed at radicalisation, the individual vulnerabilities that radical groups use to exploit and recruit, the harmful and violent nature of radical groups and their financial and political aims, a clear demonstrations of the real world consequences of online violence, and easily accessible off-ramps for individuals who have already been radicalised but want to escape these groups.

These off-ramps could include grant funding for civil society de-radicalisation groups that run online chat groups to support those trapped in radical groups, requiring social media companies to de-amplify radical content and algorithmically promote de-radicalisation support groups, and building a community of practice among psychological health practitioners specialising in re-radicalisation.

Much more support is needed for survivors of online hate and special consideration needs to be given to women – as misogyny and violence against women is the through-line that connects all radical online ideologies. Researchers who have contributed this report warn that hatred against women is becoming more widespread and normalised in online culture, noting the potential of social media for mass radicalisation rather than just radicalisation of fringe individuals. These researchers recommend strong legal measures, such as criminalising online sexual violence such as deep fake pornography in a similar way to real world sexual harassment and assault.

SUPPORT CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS ADVOCATING FOR DIGITAL RIGHTS

Many human rights champions have noted that a strong civil society is critical to safeguarding rights. Even democratic governments sometimes have strong incentives to trade rights away, to use the power they have to entrench their own power by targeting critics and removing alternatives.

The Australian Human Rights Commission could lead an effort to promote more civil society organisations working to further digital rights. A human rights bill in Australia could provide a stronger legal anchor to these efforts. In addition, the government could earmark funds to support to civil society human rights organisations at all levels – as well as to civil society more broadly as part of a civil defence against anti-democratic forces, including those that manifest in online environments.

At this current moment, human rights organisations are too under-resourced to grapple meaningfully with the issue of digital rights. For example, groups in the National Women’s Alliance often have two or three staff, and there no high-profile organisations focused on how to protect the basic human rights of women online.

There also need to be mechanisms created to connect researchers with civil society advocates and problem solvers on this issue, and policy makers would be well served by better, comprehensive and consistent research on public attitudes towards social media and online life.

Another thing to be considered is measures to improve access to justice for online harms, which could include creating a legal defence fund that can be accessed by vulnerable groups to pursue online abusers.

And there also needs to be funding available for civil society organisations to invest in cybersecurity. Globally and in Australia, these organisations are subject to cyberattacks, hacking and denial of service (DoS) attacks, mostly from hostile authoritarian governments but also from powerful actors within democratic nations. The same applies to news organisations, where especially smaller, investigative organisations are being targeted by increasingly confident authoritarian forces.

SUPPORT FACT-CHECKING ORGANISATIONS

Part of this public literacy strategy could include providing adequate and long-term funding to non-partisan fact-checking authorities operating at arm’s length from government. This would help elevate the work of fact-checkers in public debates and would demonstrate a commitment to transparency and accuracy.

It should be noted that existing fact-checking bodies – most often located in universities – need urgent support. They are often resource-poor at the same time as coming under constant attack from powerful partisan forces who may be keen to see a politics of disinformation take hold. The more credible fact-checkers there are in an information system, the harder it is to attack the notion of fact-checking.

It is critically important that fact-checkers are able to scrutinise political claims. One sign that a political culture of disinformation is developing is when elected political officials regularly make easily disprovable false claims with seeming impunity because they are backed by a partisan media ecosystem. In theory, these claims may be easily disproven, but in an information environment eroded by disinformation, emotive false claims are powerful. When those with strong professional norms around truth-telling and verifiability have already been systematically attacked – such as fact-checkers, academics, journalists and public servants – it will be much harder for their fact-checking to gain traction.

A legislative approach to disinformation could require social media platforms to fund fact-checkers in the countries in which they operate, or to have contributor moderation policies like X’s Community Notes.

New generative artificial intelligence (AI) technologies also need to be urgently explored for their fact-checking potential, keeping in mind that these technologies currently have a problem with accuracy, verifiability and bias. Generative AI has the potential to completely overwhelm the resources of factcheckers, both within and outside newsrooms, as well as the attention of the public in trying to keep up with verifying misleading images. This is a huge challenge which needs gatekeepers at every level of AI image, text and sound generation.

There also needs be more media space given to entities that can broadcast what is true consistently rather than waiting on events to report on something. Wikipedia serves this function but is vulnerable to coordinated disinformation attacks, DoS attacks, government censorship, a dwindling number of editors and declining levels of fundraising from readers. It also privileges text-based information.

FOCUS ON PRE-BUNKING DISINFORMATION

Australia needs to find a systematic way for government and media to pre-bunk – or pre-emptively debunk – likely areas of disinformation. Many studies have shown that pre-bunking is an effective tool in countering false information. It may also be more scalable than retrospective targeted debunking.

At the government level, a much-cited example of this was the US declassification and release of intelligence showing Russia’s intention to invade Ukraine, which to some degree frustrated Moscow’s attempt to set the narrative around the invasion.

This effort would require a change of culture in government communications teams, which are currently extremely reactive. They would need to hire disinformation specialists and have access to information on disinformation narrative trends.

It is important to note that pre-bunking of visual disinformation in the form of memes and deep fakes is critical here, as is being able to predict the kinds of disinformation narratives that will emerge out of events so as to pre-emptively seed truthful framing of these events.

SUPPORT A STRONG, DIVERSE PUBLIC INTEREST JOURNALISM SECTOR

Public interest journalism – journalism that supports accountability in a democratic society – has been in jeopardy ever since the advertising model that sustained it migrated to social media. Google and Meta now between them account for 80% of the online advertising market.

Since public interest journalism can no longer depend on advertising or online subscriptions for long-term survival, in both metropolitan and regional areas, the government should urgently support measures to develop large-scale alternative sources of funding.

If current trends continue without intervention, the result will probably be the further concentration of news organisations into ever tighter global monopolies, with national and regional news resources collapsing.

The Australian government has already attempted to support news income through the 2021 News Media Bargaining Code, whose purpose was to make large social media platforms operating in Australia pay for news content. However, with the likely demise of this agreement, announced by Meta this year, it is time to consider other measures such as a special digital platform tax, the revenues of which could be channelled towards news.

And given Meta has also signalled that it will no longer promote news and political content on its sites, an additional requirement could stipulate that platforms are required to promote credible and accurate news content.

In addition, the government needs to support Australian news organisations in their consultations with AI companies, as these companies attempt to integrate live news into chatbots and other AI products. Smaller news players especially need support.

To encourage diversity, this support for news journalism must be done in away that does not entrench existing news organisations and information monopolies but encourages new players to emerge.

Complementary policies could include tax incentives for news producers as well as for philanthropic support. Not-for-profit or employee-owned corporate structures for media companies could be modelled and encouraged. The most well-known of these is the Scott Trust which owns The Guardian. These kinds of trusts could be replicated in Australia to provide stable base funding and freedom from political interference.

Another approach could tackle the demand side in the form of government funding for news subscriptions that are distributed on the basis of means testing. Given that most credible news is now only accessible through prohibitive pay walls, restoring public access to diverse and accurate news sources has become a critical issue.

It may also be useful to find ways of supporting the de-commercialisation of some aspects of the digital public square so that it is able to support an accurate public information commons. Wikipedia is an example of a successful non-commercial model.

Secure, long-term funding should also be given to establish public disinformation research teams and internet observatories in universities. A public interest non-partisan think tank devoted to aggregating this research and promoting national public debate on issues on the intersection of information, democracy and national security should also be funded. A model worth considering here is something like the European Digital Media Observatory, which could be funded through disinformation legislation. It would be multidisciplinary and produce reports and media content, acting as a kind of expert civil society watchdog for platforms operating in Australia.

These measures could be accompanied by a broad-based multiplatform media product which aggregates the disinformation research being done in Australia and overseas as a resource for government, researchers and the public. Such a product could be hosted by existing public interest media organisations, such as The Conversation, which may be more trusted than a directly funded government channel.

USE INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY FOR A HEALTHY GLOBAL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Tackling the structural issues involved in the increasing spread of disinformation and propaganda will not be possible without developing greater strategic alignment with allies and partners in working for a healthy global information environment. This will require commitment of resources to create mechanisms for consistent, regular and results-based international engagement on this issue. This would entail a clear recognition that the same forces that are spreading disinformation online are also attacking the multilateral system that is grounded in ideas about the rule of law and universal human rights.

For example, Australia might want to explore a more unified approach to disinformation and platform regulation with the US and EU, to better address the cross-jurisdictional nature of the disinformation problem. This might include coordinated support and further development of norms that embed access to accurate information as a human right. It may be building communication networks to deal with global public health crises stemming from conflict, pandemics and climate change.

Another measure could be to exchange research, policy ideas and intelligence on disinformation and to protect researchers from being targeted by disinformation networks and the political actors that use them. A unified approach might also mean partnering to support a body like the Facebook Oversight Board, but with a broadened remit to include multiple platforms. This body would incorporate strong community feedback mechanisms and would require platforms to have robust complaint and feedback processes.

Another area for consideration is working with partners and allies on the application of legal and financial sanctions against enablers of disinformation, online exploitation and human rights abuses. As one example of these kinds of measures, the EU will has put forward financial sanctions of up to 10 percent of global revenue against digital and broadcast media companies that ignore EU directives for the removal of disinformation networks from their platforms. In another example, the US Department of Commerce has recently blacklisted a Canadian company Sandvine for providing online censorship and surveillance tools to the Egyptian government which were used to block news and to target political actors and human rights activists. Australia could consider supporting these efforts through similarly aligned sanctions measures, perhaps through the Magnitsky Act.

INCLUDE DISINFORMATION IN ELECTION AND GOVERNANCE SUPPORT

2024 will be a watershed election year, with 60 elections affecting 4 billion people. All these elections will struggle with disinformation. When Australia supports free and fair elections though UN processes and other multi- and bilateral relationships, it could also develop a system of support to help countries deal with disinformation through election cycles. Seeing promoting a truth-based information environment as part of Australia’s development partnerships – including making this a centrepiece of Australia’s brand abroad – could boost the nation’s influence in the region and in its relationship with allies.

SUPPORT RESILIENT INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE

Where access to information infrastructure is an issue – due to geography, lack of electricity, poor distribution of print media or digital access being cut due to a natural disaster – Australia and partners will need to think more creatively about developing alternative information pathways. For example, when an earthquake in Tonga damaged its undersea cable, the island was cut off from information flows. Starlink was able to reconfigure its constellation in Tonga’s direction to restore some information flows which was critical in dealing with the disaster.

These actions could also contribute Australia’s strategic communications capability by identifying the kinds of information assets that Australia might need to deploy in both friendly and hostile conditions. For example, in a humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) effort, Australia might need to communicate directly to reach people on the ground.

INCREASE INVESTMENT IN INDO-PACIFIC MEDIA

Consultees recommended that Australia’s strategy for regional outreach should be urgently expanded to match the magnitude of the information environment challenges in the region. This includes supporting regional broadcasting and news, regional cultural content and storytelling, a social media strategy to promote credible information, and disinformation literacy training. Non-government entities should be involved in all these efforts.

It should be noted however that outreach to the region on bolstering credible, accurate journalism and countering propaganda and disinformation will face a number of cultural and political challenges. These include cultural and language barriers, lack of understanding of regional social media, regulatory and disinformation ecosystems, illiberal political and cultural environments in which ruling elites have embraced both media censorship and the disinformation as tools of political rule, as well as of foreign and security policy.

Australia is already active in this space, mostly in the Pacific. Consultees praised the Pacific Media Assistance Scheme, which is supporting several independent media reporting projects. While the quality of the program is good, it is not operating at the scale needed to achieve the objectives of preserving a free, open, diverse and credible media in the region.

For example, Australia’s Pacific broadcasting strategy still spends less than one Australian dollar per capita compared to Japan which spends roughly $4.50 on overseas broadcasting and Germany which spends $7.00 per person. Research from the Lowy Institute shows that over decades there has been a policy gap on strategic communications that underestimates the role of the media in enhancing Australia’s soft power and leveraging it to achieve its objectives internationally. This blind spot must be urgently addressed to navigate this era of fast spreading disinformation.

A quadrupling of the regional broadcasting budget – approximately 0.6 of the development budget – would a be a useful benchmark, according to some participants. Funding that is currently going to public relations could be redirected into supporting independent media regionally.

In doing this, Australia would need to have a very transparent agenda in supporting independent verified information, one which would include submitting Australian policy and action in the region to scrutiny.

Participants reported that the outlook for independent media in the Pacific is dire. Pacific media needs support in the form of training and resources to transition to digital, and to deal with disinformation, including highly manipulated images.

Support for management is also critical in three major respects. One is training managers in up-to-date management methods that encourage young journalists, especially women, to stay in the sector. This training would cover issues like respect at work, flexible working hours and zero tolerance for bullying and sexual harassment.

The second issue is finding sustainable digital business models that can support public interest journalism. This could include looking at charitable trusts, non-profit and collective ownership models.

A third issue faced by regional media managers is in creating a reliable pipeline of media talent. It was noted that many young journalists in the region are being invited to China to undergo media training and come back with Chinese talking points, publishing Chinese press releases.

Australia should invest in substantive journalism training – not just for a few weeks, but ongoing – to support a culture of accurate, credible and accountable journalism and analysis. Australia could also invest more in supporting the wages of journalists through its development program. Small media organisations looking for a financial lifeline are vulnerable to capture by foreign and domestic elements interested in subverting press freedom, so this is an area where Australia could make a big difference for a small cost.

Another element is strengthening the professional networks of reporters, presenters, producers and editors in the region. Threats to media freedom are rising from foreign and domestic forces. Media organisations are doing their best to help their members push back against these pressures, but these organisations have few resources and are often run on a volunteer basis. Providing funding for one or two paid staff members would help make these organisations more effective. Consultees mentioned that in countries such as Papua New Guinea, the media is facing restrictive legislation. The media needs to be able to be strong stakeholders and to act before press freedoms are legislated out of existence.

Similarly, networks outside the region can be extremely valuable. For example, public sector media in Australia will report on the region when commercial media fails to do so for financial reasons. As a result, Pacific journalists sometimes leak to trusted Australian journalists to get an important story covered. But public broadcast media would need to fund at least one permanent Pacific correspondent, based in nations like Fiji and Vanuatu for this dynamic to become more effective.

Restoring news and public interest media in the region is critical to countering a rising tide of disinformation. With Facebook dominant and newspaper sales falling, quality mainstream media has an important role. This was especially evident in Fiji during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the community was dealing significant mis- and dis-information. The Fiji Times had an hour-long live program which dealt with false information about the pandemic, hosting local doctors on air. This approach was very influential in maintaining public health and social stability during the crisis.

Consultees considered that disinformation flows in the region come mainly from China, North America and Indonesia. Most recently, journalists have noted rising levels of propaganda and disinformation from Israel, which finds fertile ground in a heavily religious region that considers the nation to be the biblical Lost Tribe. There are propaganda and disinformation campaigns coming out of Jakarta are aimed at eroding support for West Papuan independence.

If nothing is done, consultees warned, in a decade there will be no credible news left in the region. Even now, once reputable sites in PNG are now publishing graphic torture images and are flooded with non-critical stories about sorcery. As these stories have been widely disseminated by social media, belief in sorcery – which used to be confined to the Highlands – has now taken hold in coastal areas.

The creation of disinformation observatories would be extremely useful here. These could consist of a Facebook page run by two or three journalists that track and call out disinformation narratives across the region. One example of this low-cost approach in the area of news aggregation is the Pacific Newsroom Facebook page, which consultees agreed was an invaluable resource, aggregating the region’s best independent news. It is currently run by volunteers. This model could also be applied to a disinformation resource, but it is important to note that volunteer models are probably not sustainable in the long term and would need funding support.

For even more effectiveness, Australia needs to explore the potential to work with the United States on media in the Pacific. Australia has been leading on media development in the region on a shoestring budget, however USAID has just announced a program to support media in the region which in budgetary terms dwarfs what Australia has been able to do.

Australia could also help the Pacific to negotiate with major social media platforms to remove harmful coordinated disinformation networks and to navigate cultural nuances: for example, posts of Pacific people painted for ceremonies are often taken down because they contain nudity.

Beyond news, Australia could partner with Pacific talent to create cultural storytelling content, comedy and drama series, talk shows, podcasts and a variety of other content forms, showcasing Pacific culture.

All these actions would help build trusted, non-transactional relationships in the region and preserve the flow of factual information. Without good reporting, it is very difficult to formulate defence, development and diplomatic strategy and to verify intelligence – in essence to get any kind of accurate picture of a region so important to Australia’s interests.